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We consider a distributed team decision problem in which different agents obtain from the environ-
ment different stochastic measurements, possibly at different random times, related to the same
uncertain random vector. Each agent has the same objective function and prior probability distribu-
tion. We assume that each agent can compute an optimal tentative decision based upon his own
observation and that these tentative decisions are communicated and received, possibly at random
times, by a subset of other agents. Conditions for asymptotic convergence of each agent's decision
sequence and asymptotic agreement of all agents' decisions are derived.
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:. INTRODUCTION.
Consider the following situation: A set {1, . . ., N} of N agents possessing a common model of
the world (same prior probabilities) and having the same cost function want to make a decision. Each
agent bases his decision on a set of observations he has obtained and we allow these observations to
be different for each agent. Given this setting, the decisions of the agents will be generally unrelated.
Aumann [1] has shown, however, that agreement is guaranteed in the following particular case:
If the decision to be made is the evaluation of the posterior probability of some event and if all
agents' posteriors are common knowledge, then all agents agree. (In Aumann's terminology, common
knowledge of an event means that all agents know it, all agents know that all agents know it, and
so on, ad infinitum. )
The situation where each agent's posterior is common knowledge is very unlikely, in general.
On the other hand, if agreement is to be guaranteed, posteriors have to be common knowledge. The
problem then becomes how to reach a state of agreement where decisions are common knowledge,
starting from an initial state of disagreement.
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [6] and Borkar and Varaiya [5] gave the following natural
solution to the above problem: Namely, agents start communicating to each other their tentative
posteriors (or, in the formulation of [5] the conditional expectation of a fixed random variable) and
then update their own posterior, taking into account the new information they have received. In
the limit, each person's posterior converges (by the martingale convergence theorem) and assuming
that "enough" communications have taken place, they all have to converge to a common limit.
The above results hold even when each agent obtains additional raw observations during the
adjustment process and when the history of communications is itself random. Similar results were
also proved for a detection problem [5].
A related - and much more general situation - is the subject of this paper; we assume that the
agents are not just interested in obtaining an optimal estimate or a likelihood ratio, but their objective
is to actually minimize an arbitrary cost function. In this setting, it is reasonable to assume that
agents communicate to each other tentative decisions. That is, at any time, an agent computes an
optimal decision given the information he possesses and communicates it to other agents. Whenever
an agent receives such a message from another agent, his information essentially increases and he will,
in general, update his own tentative decision, and so on. In the sequel we prove that the qualitative
results obtained in [5], [6] for the estimation problem (convergence and asymptotic agreement) are
also valid for the decision making problem for several, quite general, choices of the structure of the
cost function. However, tentative decisions do not form a martingale sequence and a substantially
different mathematical approach is required. We point out that estimation problems are a special
case of the decision problems studied in this paper, being equivalent to the minimization of the mean
square error.
A drawback of the above setting is that each agent is assumed to have an infinite memory. We
have implicitly assumed that the knowledge of an agent can only increase with time and, therefore,
he has to remember the entire sequence of messages he has received in the past. There is also
the implicit assumption that if an agent receives additional raw data from the environment, while
the communication process is going on, these data are remembered forever. These assumptions
are undesirable, especially if the agents are supposed to be humans, because limited memory is a
fundamental component of the bounded rationality behavior of human decision makers. We will
therefore relax the infinite memory assumption and allow the agents to forget any portion of their
past knowledge. We only constrain them to remember their most recent decision and the most recent
message (tentative decision) coming from another agent. We then obtain results similar to those
obtained for the unbounded memory model, although in a slightly weaker sense.
A particular problem of interest is one in which all random variables are jointly Gaussian and the
cost is a quadratic function of an unknown state of the world and the decision. It was demonstrated
in [5] that the common limit to which decisions converge (for the estimation problem) is actually
the centralized estimate, i.e. the estimate that would be obtained if all agents were to communicate
their detailed observations. We prove (section 4) that the same is true in the presence of memory
limitations, provided that each agent never forgets his own raw observations. (That is, he may only
forget past tentative decisions sent to him by other agents.)
We end this section with a discussion of the nature of our model and the possible range of its
validity. The first point to be made is that there are strong underlying rationality assumptions if we
postulate that our model describes the way that humans update their decisions, even if we constrain
them to have limited memory. The decision of an agent at some stage is the optimal decision given
his observations and some tentative decisions of other agents that have been communicated to him.
Except for particular problems such as linear quadratic gaussian decision problems, this corresponds
to a very hard optimization problem. The reason is that the other agents' tentative decisions rep-
resent an indirect way of communicating information. Essentially, when agent A receives agent B's
decision, he tries to deduce B's observations from B's decision. So, one agent combines information
to obtain an optimal decision and the other agent tries to invert this map and recover the original
information. While this is mathematically meaningful, it is, in general, beyond the information
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p)roccssing capabilities of human decision makers. In view of the above, we propose the following
interpretation: while it is not true that human decision makers will actually do the computations
prescribed by the model, a group of well-trained individuals, very familiar with the decision problem
at hand will make tentative decisions close to the ones predicted by the model and will agree in the
limit. Bacharach [2, p.183] gives some support to the above statement by citing evidence that "in
practice awareness of others' opinions tends to modify one's own: in the case of factual questions a
general tendency to converge has often been observed".
A second weak point of the model is that not only each agent has the same prior information and
knows the statistics of the other agents' observations but also has the same model of the probabil-
istic mechanism that generates inter--agent communications. In particular, if this is a deterministic
mechanism, an agent must know the precise history of communications between any pair of other
agents, a very strong requirement. This weakness disappears, however, if every tentative decision
is broadcasted simultaneously to all other agents. This will be the case, for example, if a set of
experts with the same objective teleconfer and take turns into suggesting what they believe to be
the optimal decision.
Finally, we poiht out that our scheme is fundamentally different from schemes for distributed
decision making and computation in which each agent controls his own decision variable and the
cost function depends jointly on all agents' control variables [3, 7]. What we have here is a common
decision variable which has to be jointly fixed by a set of decision makers.
3
1J. MODEL FORMULATION.
In this section we present a mathematical formulation of the model informally described in the
introduction. We start with a most general set of assumptions and later proceed to the development
of alternative specialized models to be considered (e.g. memory limitations, particular forms of the
cost function etc.). As far as the description of the sequence of communications and updates goes,
we basically adopt the model of Borkar and Varaiya [5] except that time is considered to be discrete.
As in [5], events are timed with respect to a common, absolute clock. As far as notation is concerned,
we will use subscripts to denote time and superscripts to denote agents.
We assume that we are given a set {1, . . ., N} of N agents, an underlying probability space
(02,F, G,) and a scalar valued cost function c:Q X U H- R, where U is the set of admissible values
of the decision variable. It will be useful in the sequel to distinguish between elements of U and U-
valued random variables. The letter v will be used to denote elements of U whereas u, w will be
used to denote U-valued random variables (measurable functions from Q to U).
Our first assumption is of a purely technical nature and is satisfied by almost all probability
spaces arising in applications. The following two assumptions, however, are of a more essential
nature.
Assumption 1: fQ is a Polish (complete, separable, metric) space and G6 is the associated Borel a-field
(the a-field generated by the open subsets of f2).
Assumption 2: Either
(2.1): U is a finite set, or
(2.2): U is a closed, convex subset of R n .
Assumption 3: The cost function c is nonnegative and jointly measurable in (w, v). Moreover,
E[c(v)] < oo, Vv E U. When assumption (2.2) holds, we assume that there exists a positive,
measurable and integrable function A:Q - R such that
A()llv, -- v2 2<+ C(W [c(wv 2 ] v1)2 Vw CZ2, VI, v2 U. (1)
The last part of assumption 3 states that c is a strictly convex function of v and strict convexity
holds in a uniform way, for any fixed w GC f. This assumption is satisfied, in particular, if c is twice
continuously differentiable in v and its Hessian is positive definite, uniformly in v, for any fixed
w E Q2. It is also satisfied if c is strictly convex and U is a compact set.
We may use the function A, defined in assumption 3, to define a new measure it on (Q1, 5f) by
=(B) = A(w)d9(w), B E W. (2)
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This measure will be very useful in section 3.
We now consider the generic situation facing agent i at some time n. Let 6Ji C J be a a-field
of events describing the information possessed by agent i at time n. Because of assumption 3, the
conditional expectation E[c(v)lI6j] exists (is finite), is 1 In-measurable and is uniquely determined up
to a set of measure zero [10], for any fixed v C U. Agent i then computes a tentative decision u'
that minimizes E[c(v)lIG].
We are now forced into a mathematical digression that will ensure that Uri is well-defined and
determines a (FX-measurable random variable.
We need to pay special attention only for the convex, continuous problem (assumptions 2.2
and 3). We introduce another technical assumption describing the kind of knowledge an agent may
possess at some point in time. Similarly with assumption 1, it poses no real restriction. Roughly
speaking, it states that the knowledge of an agent can be described by a Polish probability space.
Assumption 4: If 3 / C Gf describes the knowledge of agent i at time n, there exists a Polish prob-
ability space (Q*,f*, P*) and a mapping f:Q Q- fQ* such that ti is the smallest a-field that makes
f measurable and G*(B) = -9(f-'(B)), VB CE *.
We then have the following Lemma (proved in the Appendix):
Lemma 1: Under assumptions 1, 2.2, 3, 4, there exists an almost everywhere unique, 6 /- measurable
random variable u, such that
E[c(utL)In]_<E[c(w)1Jj], almost surely, (3)
for any U-valued, GW/-measurable random variable w. Moreover, E[c(u')] = E[c(w)] for some .t-
measurable w if and only if u n -= w, almost everywhere. The same results are true, (except for
uniqueness) under assumption 2.1.
We continue with a description of the process of communications between agents. When, at time
n, agent i computes his tentative optimal decision us, he may communicate it to any other agent.
(If u' is not unique, a particular minimizing u n is selected according to some commonly known rule.)
Whether, when and to which agents uiX is to be sent is a random event whose statistics are described
by (Q, AW, 9). We also allow the transmission time to be random but finite. We assume that when an
agent receives a message he knows the identity of the agent who sent it.
Note that the time at which an agent receives a message is a random variable on (l, U, 9).
As pointed out in [5], this allows the possibility of signalling additional information, beyond that
contained in u/, by appropriately choosing when and to which agents to communicate.
We now impose conditions on the number of messages to be communicated in the long run;
these conditions are necessary for agreement to be guarantec(d. Namely, we require that there is an
indirect communication link from any agent to any other agent which is used an infinite number of
tinies. This can be made precise as follows:
Let A(i) be the set of all agents that send an infinite number of messages to agent i, with
probability 1.. Then, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 5: There is a sequence ml,..., mnkt -1 = ml of not necessarily distinct agents such that
mni G A(mi+l), i = 1, 2,..., k. Each agent appears at least once in this sequence.
The nroain consequence of assumption 5, which will be repeatedly used, is the following: If
{hi: 1, ... , N} is a set of numbers such that hi-h j, Vj C A(i), Vi, then hi = hj, Vi, j.
We continue with a more detailed specification of the operation of the agents. We introduce
assumptions on the knowledge IS which are directly related to the properties of the memory of agent
i. An agent may receive (at any time) observations on the state of the world or receive tentative
decisions (messages) of other agents. The knowledge of an agent at some time will be a subset
(depending on the properties of his memory) of the total information he has received up to that
time. We consider three alternative models of memory, formalized with the three assumptions that
follow.
Let wi be the last message received by agent i up to (and including) time n. Our most general
assumption requires that w and u_ l are remembered at time n:
Assumption 6: (Imperfect Memory) The a-field IFS is such that ui_1 and wn are Sf-measurable.
Remark: Assumption 6 makes sense only because of Lemma 1 which guarantees that ui_1 and wn
are If-measurable. We can then define, inductively, T'/ to be the smallest sub-o-field of of with
respect to which u2 1_, wi and any other information rememberd are measurable.
Assumption 7: (Imperfect Memory; Own Data Remembered) Let Gi be the subfield of fG describing
all information that has been observed by agent i up to time n, except for the messages of other
agents. We assume that assumption 6 holds and that G/ C l.
Assumption 8: (Perfect Memory) We let assumptions 6 and 7 hold and assume that 6fit C n+l,
Vi, n.
So, with assumption 6 we only assume that an agent remembers the content of the last message he
received, as well as his last tentative decision. With assumption 7 we also assume that he remembers
all his past observations but is still allowed to forget the contents of the past messages he received.
In this case the total information available to all agents is preserved. Finally, assumption 8 implies
that the knowledge of an agent can only increase. Whenever assumption 8 holds, we will denote by
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5' the smallest o-field in UJ containing 9t ', for all n.
We conclude this section by defining a few problems of particular interest:
(i) Estimation Problem: Given a Rl-valued random vector x on (, J, .S), let U = R-' and c(v) =
(x - v)7 '(x -- v), where T denotes transpose. It is easy to see that this is a particular case of a strictly
convex function covered by assumption 3, with A(w) being a constant.
(ii) Static Linear Quadratic Gaussian Decision Problem (LQG): Let x be an unknown random vec-
tor. Let the sequence of transmissioin and reception times be deterministic. We assume that the
random variables observed by the agents are, together with x, jointly normally distributed. We
allow the total number of observations to be infinite, although we consider separately the finite-
dimensional problem. Let U = Rn and let the cost function be c(v) - vTRV + X7 Qv, with R > 0. It
follows that the optimal tentative decision of agent i at time n is u', = GE[xl"t ]- E[GxlI6J, where
G is a precomputable matrix. If we redefine the unknown vector x to be equal to Gx instead of x,
we conclude that we may restrict to estimation problems, without loss of generality.
(iii) Finite Probability Spaces: Here we let 9 be a finite set. Then, there exist finitely many a-fields of
subsets of Q. It follows that tentative decisions can take finitely many values. We therefore assume,
without loss of generality, that U is also a finite set.
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III. CONVERGENCE AND AGREEMENT RESULTS.
In this section we state and discuss our main results. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Assumptions 1, 3, 4 and 5 will be assumed throughout the rest of the paper and will not be explicitly
mentioned in the statement of each Theorem. We start with the least restrictive assumptions on
memory:
Theorem 1: Under assumptions 2.2 (convex costs), 6 (imperfect memory) And deterministic trans-
missions and receptions:
a) limrL _(un l -- ui) = O, in probability and in L 2(7, G%, tP).
b) limr,_(u~ - uJ) -= 0, Vi, j, in probability and in L 2(Q, GF, A).
Consider the following situation: At time zero, before any observations are obtained, the se-
quence of transmissions and receptions is selected in random, according to a statistical law which
is independent from all observations to be obtained in the future and from c(v), for any v E U. In
other words, communications do not carry any information other than the content of the message
being communicated (no signalling allowed). Suppose that the sequence of communications that has
been selected becomes known to all . gents. From that point on, the situation is identical with that
of deterministic communications. In fact, a moment's thought will show that it is sufficient for the
history of communications to become commonly known as it occurs: agent i only needs to know, at
time n, what communications have occured up to that time, so that he can interpret correctly the
meaning of the messages he is receiving.
We can formalize these ideas as follows: We are given a product probability space (7 X Q*, 1F X
off*, P X ,P*) where (Q, A, P) satisfies assumptions 1 and 4 (for any sequence of communications) and
where (Q*, f*, %*) describes the communications process. For each w* GE *, we obtain a distributed
decision problem on (Q2, F, 9P) with deterministic communications. In that case:
Theorem 2: Under assumptions 2.2, 6 and independent communications (as described above),
limnt,(un+l - u) = limnoo(u / - uAn) = 0, in probability with respect to 9 X P*.
Strictly speaking, Theorems I and 2 do not guarantee convergence of the decisions of each agent.
Suppose, however, that the agents operate under the following rule: Fix some small Y > 0. Let the
sequence of communications and updates of tentative decisions take place until ju/ - u J < y, Vi, j
(small disagreement) and u U' I-u < y, Vi (small foreseeable changes in tentative decisions).
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Then, we obtain:
Corollary 1: With the above rule and the assumptions of Theorems 1 or 2, the process terminates
in finite time, with probability 1, for any -y > 0.
When Q and U are finite, we have:
Theorem 3: If 2Q and U are finite sets, if each agent communicates all the values of v that minimize
E[c(v)fJfl ] and if assumption 6 holds, then there exists some positive integer Q such that
u = uQ, ¥Vi,j and uQ+ ,,=u, , Vi, Vn, Vw Q2.
Strictly speaking, tentative decisions in the above theorem are not elements of U but subsets
of U. This is due to the non-uniqueness of optimal tentative decisions, in the absence of convexity.
The equalities appearing in Theorem 3 have to be interpreted, therefore, as equalities of sets.
We now assume that the agents have perfect memory. We obtain results similar to theorems 1
and 2 under much more relaxed assumptions on the communications process. Namely, we only need
to assume the following:
Assumption 9: Let M? be the k-th message sent by agent j to agent i. We assume that when agent
i receives M ij , he knows that this is indeed the k-th message sent to him by agent j.
Remark: This assumption is trivially satisfied if messages arrive at exactly the same order as they
are sent, with probability 1.
Theorem 4: Under assumptions 2.2 (convex costs), 8 (perfect memory) and 9, there exists a U-
valued random variable u* such that lim,,_0 u - u*, Vi, in probability and in L 2(0, if, it).
For estimation problems (u· = E[xlF'), theorem 4 can be slightly strengthened: [5, Theorem 1]
Theorem 5: For estimation problems, under the assumptions of theorem 4, convergence to u* takes
place with probability 1.
We now consider the case where U is finite but (unlike theorem 3) Q2 is allowed to be infinite.
Several complications may arise, all of them due to the fact that optimal decisions, given some
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information, are not guaranteed to be unique. We discuss these issues briefly, in order to motivate
the next theorem.
Suppose that U -- {vl, v2 }. It is conceivable that E[c(v,)IF 1 l - E[c(v 2)1tjY] is never zero and
changes sign an infinite number of times, on a set of positive probability. In that case, the deci-
sions of agent i do not convege. Even worse, it is conceivable that E[c(vl)lj ] > E[c(v2 )l"bJ and
E[c(vi) l,] < E[c(v2)l1Fj], for all n and for all w in a set of positive probability, in which case agents i
and.j disagree foever. It is not hard to show that in both of the above cases E[c(vi)jc: F] = E[c(v 2)jlJ],
on a set of positive probability and this non-uniqueness is the source of the pathology. The following
theorem states that convergence and agreement are still obtained, provided that we explicitly exclude
the possibility of non-uniqueness.
Theorem 6: Under assumptions 2.1 (finite U) and 8 (perfect memory) and if the random variable ui
that minimizes E[c(w)] over all GS/ -measurable random variables is unique up to a set of measure
zero, for all i, then lim,,,, u -_ u', almost surely, and ui = ui, Vi, j.
Although the preceding theorems guarantee that (under certain conditions) all agents will agree,
nothing has been said concerning the particular decision to which all agents' decisions converge. In
particular, it is not necessarily true, as one would be tempted to conjecture, that the limit decision is
the optimal centralized solution (that is, the solution to be obtained if all agents were to communicate
all their information). On the other hand, the centralized solution is reached for LQG.problems,
under the perfect memory assumption [5] and is also reached generically for an estimation problem
on a finite probability space [6]. This issue will be touched again in the next section.
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IV. TIHE LINEAR QUADRATIC GAUSSIAN (LQG) MODEL.
In this section we specialize and strengthen some of our results by restricting to the Linear Quadratic
Gaussian model described in section 2. (Recall that any such problem is equivalent to an estimation
problem; therefore, u, = At,= E['1jigj, for some random vector x.) Theorems 1, 3 and 4 are
applicable. Moreover, the results of [5] guarantee that, under assumption 8 (perfect memory), ui
converges to the optimal centralized estimate, given the information possbessed by all agents. The
following theorem states that the sanme is true under the weaker assumption 7.
Theorem 7: For the LQG problem and under assumption 7 (imperfect memory; own data remnem-
bered) lim,_oo = x, in the mean square, where x = E[xlsFo] and 9Fo is the smallest o-field
containing 9:, for all i, n.
Note that theorem 7 is much stronger than theorem 1 which was proved for the general case of
imperfect memory. We have here convergence to a limit solution which is also guaranteed to be the
optimal centralized solution.
Our final result concerns the finite dimensional LQG problem in which the total number of
observations is finite. Namely, the smallest A-field containing . n for all i, n is generated by a finite
number of (jointly Gaussian) random variables. In that case, the centralized solution is going to be
reached by all agents in a finite number of stages, provided that all agents have perfect memory.
Theorem 8: For the LQG problem with finitely many observations and under assumption 8 (perfect
memory), the centralized solution is reached by all agents in a finite number of stages.
Theorems 7 and 8 imply that the scheme considered in this paper may be viewed as a distributed
way of solving static linear estimation problems.
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V. CONCLUSIONS.
A set of agents with the same objective who start communicating to each other their tentative
optimal decisions are guaranteed to agree in the limit. This is true even if their memory is limited
and they are allowed to forget some of their past knowledge. Moreover, they are guaranteed to
converge to the optimal centralized decision for linear estimation problems, provided that they do
not forget their own observations. These results are valid when all agents share the same model of
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VII. APPENDIX.
Proof of Lemma 1: By theorem 1.1.6 and corollary 1.1.7 of [9], there exists a condtional probability'
distribution {Q.: wE Q} of UP given GF and, for any v E U, a version of E[c(v)jl'] such that
E [c(v) I , ·= c(v)dQ . (4)
Equation (4) and assumption 3 imply that E[c(v)lJ5] is a strictly convex function of v, diverging to
infinity as IlvII-0oo, Vw E 2
By assumption 4, there exists a Polish probability space (Q2*, 9*, Y*) and a mapping f:fQ2 H Q*
such that 9: is the smallest o-field in 9F with respect to which f is measurable. Moreover, 9* is the
measure induced by 96; namely, SP*(B) = 9(f-'(B)), VB CG *. We then use theorem T18 (p. 10) of
[8] and the fact that (11*, 5*) is isomorphic to (S, G), where S C R and · is the Borel a-field on S
[4, p.122], to conclude that there exists a measurable function c*:U X fQ* - R such that
c*(v, f(w)) = E[c(v) 9J](w) (5)
Moreover, c* is strictly convex in v and its minimum is attained for any fixed wc* G W2*. By the
results of [4] on measurable selections (see in particular the discussion in page 259) there exists a
universally measurable function *:1f* H U such that
c*(fi*(W*), w*)c*(, W*), < *( u, ), * E G *. (6)
We now modify C*(w*) on a set of P2*-measure zero, to obtain a Borel measurable function u*:Q* " U
such that
c*(u*(w*), w*)<c*(v, w*), Vv E U, 9*-almost surely (7)
We finally define i/(w) =- i*(f(w)) and un(w) = u*(f(w)). (Note that u n is S9-measurable,
by construction, and that /(ow) minimizes E[c(v)[lJ'((w).) Let B = {w: ui(w)Si(w)} and D=
{w*: U*(w)7 4 f*(w)}. Clearly, B = f-l(D) and @*(D) = 0. So, 0 = -P*(D) = 9(f-1(D)) = 9(B).
Therefore, ui is an n /-measurable function that minimizes E[c(v)IlS, almost everywhere, and this
implies the first part of the Lemma.
For any 'Ff-measurable, U-valued random variable w, E[c(ui)jS9J•!E[c(w)Il[], almost surely,
and by integrating, E[c(u)]_<E[c(w)].
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Now suppose that E[c(un)l] = E[c(w)], for some U-valued, 6J -measurable random variable w.
Using the minimizing property of un. we have
E[ > w)] Ž 2(E[c(u)] + E[c(w)]) (8)
The converse inequality also holds, by the convexity of c. Therefore, (8) is actually an equality.
Recalling the fact that c is strictly convex, for all w C Qf, we conclude that u n = w, almost surely.
The validity of the same results (except for uniqueness) under assumption 2.1 is immediate from
the fact that the minimum of the finitely mar;y random variables {E[c(v)li] , v C U} is itself a
random variable and a measurable selection of u, is straightforward. 
Lemma 2: Let {un}, {w,j} be two sequences of U-valued random variables such that
lim E[U - = lim E[c(u7) = lim E[c(w,)] (9)
n--oo 2 1-00 n-en
If assumptions 2.2 and 3 hold, then lim, oo(un - wu,) = 0 in L 2(Q, F, AU) and in probability.
Proof: By assumptions 2.2, 3 and equation (9),
C(,-- n --O Un c Wnlim EtA(w)IIun - wn112]< lim E[ ( 7 )+c(w) (10)
n--4o o-o00 2 2
which shows that (Un - Wn) converges to zero in L 2(, , , ). Therefore, it also converges in measure
, with respect to It.
Recall that A(w) > 0 and ju(B) = fBA(w) d@(w), VB E 'Y. Therefore, ,u(B) = 0 implies 9(B) = 0
and *P is absolutely continuous with respect to ,t. Let Be = {lun - Wn, > e}. Since (un - wn) con-
verges to zero in measure It, for any e > 0, we have limn-,OO(Bt) = 0 and, by absolute continuity,
limn- oo (B- = 0, which shows that we have convergence in probability. 3
Proof of Theorem 1: Since ui is 9/-measurable, we have (by the minimizing property of ui
E[c(ut+l)]_<E[c(ui)]. Since c is nonnegative, E[c(un)] converges to some constant gi. We also note
that (ut+1 + ui)/2 is ±n+l,-measurable and by taking the limit in the relation
E[C(un+1 ) + c(u )] > E[c(u,+ )] (11)
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we obtain lim _ .E[c((uiq +1- ul)/2)] = gi. Lemma 2 then yields the first part of the theorem.
Let j E A(i). Then there exist sequences {mk} and {nk} of positive integers such that
limk-,, mk = limkc,, nk = oo and mk, nk are the times of transmission and reception, respectively,
of the k-th message from agent j to agent i. Therefore, uj is 'f/k-measurable, for all k, and
E[c(ujrjk)]E[c(uJ k)] which shows that gj<gi. Using assumption 5, we conclude that gi gi, Vi, j.
We note that (u,,k + uU;lk)/2 is S ,-measurable and, therefore,
E[c(uk) + C(n2k)] Ž E[c )] > E[c(uk)] (12)2 nk) ni 2 n'Ik-
Taking the limit in (12) and using Lemma 2, we obtain the second half of the theorem. J
Proof of Theorem 2: Theorem 1 and the discussion preceding the statement of theorem 2 show that
limn,_,(Ul+ - u) - = 0, in probability with respect to 9, for all w* E W*. Let X,n(w, w*) be the
characteristic function of the set {(w, w*): IIu +1 e}}. Then,
lim /Xnd(QPX X *)- lim ff xnd~d9*=f lim fxndPd1* = 1 (13)
n- oo n - oo n-oo
(The first equality holds by the Fubini theorem; the second by the dominated convergence theorem;
the third by convergence of (un+ l- u/) to zero, with respect to the probability measure P.) This
shows that un - ul converges to zero in probability with respect to 9P X 9*. 
Proof of Corollary 1: By theorem 1, the U X U-valued sequence of random variables (u-i U3, +1-
u/) converges to (0, 0) in probability. It therefore contains a subsequence converging to (0, 0), al-
most surely [10]. Therefore, Vyt > 0 and for almost all w E Q, Hno such that Ilun - uJ3 I< A,
ilUolt - Uo < y and the termination condition is eventually satisfied with probability one. I
Proof of Theorem 3: Because of the finiteness of Q2, there exists a finite (non-random) time after
which communications (conditioned on past events) are deterministic. We may take that time as
the initial time and assume, without loss of generality, that all communications are deterministic.
Let ui be the set of elements of U which are optimal, given if/. Let wEi denote 'Fn-measurable
random variable such that wi(w) E ui(w), Vw C Q. (Note that E[c(wn)] is independent of how
wi has been selected.) By finiteness of Q and U, there exist finitely many U-valued random vari-
ables and, since E[c(wi 1+l)]<E[c(wi)], we conclude that there exists some positive integer T and
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some gi such that E[c(wi)] = gZ, Vn > T. For any n > T, E[c(wX)] -= E[c(w+l 1)] and since
Wn is F/+l-measurable, w2i minimizes E[c(w)] over all f +l-measurable random variables. Hence,
w~(w) E u+ 1(w), Vw G £ which shows that ui(w) C u _tl(w), Vw CE Q. Again, by finiteness of U'
and £2, there exists some positive integer Q such that ut+l(w) = u'I(w), Vr, > Q, Vw GE £, Vi.
If j E A(i), there exist m, n > ..) such that w?, is c5:-measurable and this shows that gi<gi.
By assumption 5, we obtain gi2 - gj, Vi, j. Therefore, wi,, minimizes E[c(w)l over all 'Fz,-measurable
random variables and, therefore, wi (w) G u(w), or, u (W) C u',(w), Vw G £. Recalling assumption
5, we obtain u;l,(w) = ui(w), Vi, j, Vm, n > Q, Vw. i
Lemma 3: Let T be a finite stopping time of an increasing family {'f,,) of o-fields. Let u, n-
1, 2,... be random variables that minimize E[c(w)l[f,,], almost surely, over all If,i-measurable random
variables w. Then, U7' minimzes E[c(w)] over all ST-measurable random variables w, where UT = un
if and only if T = n.
Proof: Let X,, be the indicator function of the set {w: T(w) = n}. Since T is a stopping time, Xn is
Frr,-measurable. Note that XnC(U,) = XnC(UT). Let w be a fT-measurable random variable and note
that Xnc(w) = X,c(k,nw) and X,,w is fn-measurable. Therefore,
E[xc(w)lf 1] = XnE[C(xlwT)lf,] > XlE[C(uL)I1j = E[xLc(un)I1fn] = E[XLC(UT)IFlI (14)
Taking expectations, we obtain
E[Xnc(W)] > E[Xnc(Ucr)] (15)
and summing over all n's (and using the monotone convergence theorem to interchange summation
and expectation) we obtain E[c(w)] > E[c(uT)]. I
Proof of Theorem 4: Since ui is /+,-measurable, we have E[c(u +l)]<E[c(ui)]. Since c is non-
negative, E[c(ui)] converges to some constant gi. We also note that (uf + U/ +m)/2 is -'
measurable. Therefore, E[c((ut+,+n + u/)/2)] > E[c(un+,)] > gi. Fix some e > 0, and let n be large
enough so that E[c(ui)]<gi + e. Then, using assumption 3, we obtain E[A(w)llu + - ul2]je,
Vm > 0. Therefore, {un} is a Cauchy sequence in L 2(£2, F, i). By the closedness of U and com-
pleteness of L 2 spaces, there exists a U-valued random variable ui such that limn-_. un u', in
L 2(£2, G, it) and, therefore, in probability, with respect to 9. (The proof of the last implication is
contained in the proof of Lemma 2.)
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Fix some v G U. Then, {E[c(v)l9:,], n = 1, 2,...) is a uniformly integrable martingale [8,
Theorem T19, p.86]. Since E[c(u 1)IIJ _, <E[c(v)lS], a.s., and
E[E[c(u +1 +JjG_:n+l):]<E[E[c(u,;)l16, +]lF]-- E[c(uin)l4h], (16)
{E[c(u)IGcXi, n = 1, 2,,. .} is a uniformly integrable supermartingale, with respect to {q/n}.
Let j G A(i). Let ink, nk be the times of transmission and reception, respectively, of the k-th
message from j to i. Because of assumption 9, both mk and nk are stopping times of {fg}, {fl},
respectively, and since j E A(i), they are almost surely finite stopping times, for all k. Moreover,
k<mk_<nk and by the optional sampling theorem [8, Theorem T28, p.90]
E[c(uk)] > E[C(Uk)] >i
which shows that liMkE[c(u)] g'. Similarly, lim[c)] i  [(uk)] g.
Note that uij is '/nk-measurable and, by Lemma 3, E[c(uk)] > Elc(u k)]. Taking the limit,
we obtain gJ > gi, and by assumption 5, gi _ gi _ 9, Vi, j.
We now take the limit of the inequalities
fl[(.) +P c(U',ic)1 >s E 2 -JE[c(u ? (U, -)u ] )]E El- ( )] (17)
to obtain limk_, E[c((u / + uu l)/ 2 )] g and, by Lemma 2, lin L2(F, iL , /t)
and in probability.
We also take the limit of the inequalities
2c~\wnk , u [d Uin, ( t- Ur)1 \ 7;7rr (18)E[c(u) + c(u')1 E > E c(uik--)[ (18)2 [k k - 2l > i
to obtain limk_,ooE[c((u} + u'/k)/2)] = gi and, by Lemma 2, limk, O(u,- u-)- 0. Similarly, we
obtain limkoo(u4k - uj) = 0, which shows that ui = uj , almost surely. 1
Proof of Theorem 6: Fix some v G U and let B = {w: ui(w) = v}. Then, E[c(v) I'5]I <E[c(v*)[IT 1,
Vv* G U, for almost all w B. By the martingale convergence theorem [8, Theorem T17, p.84], we
conclude that, for almost all w C B, there exists some N(w) such that
E[c(v)lU, < E[c(v*)Il]§ Vn > N(w)
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Therefore, u,(w)= v, for almost all w E B and, by considering the other elements of U as well,
limn,_. un = UZ, almost surely.
If j E A(i), ui is 5' -measurable and E[c(ui)] > E[c(ui)]. By assumption 5, E[c(ui)j = E[c(ui)],
Vi, j. Therefore, for j G A(i), uj minimizes E[c(w)] over all Yf/-measurable random variables and by
the assumptions of the theorem, ui = ui, almost surely. Using assumption 5 once more, we obtain
u == U,i,j. I
Proof of Theorem 7: As is'usual in linear least squares estimation, we use the setting of Hilbert spaces
of square integrable random variables. Let' G be a IHilbert space of zero mean, jointly Gaussian ran-
dom variables on (Q2, G, P) such that each component of the unknown vector x and the observations
belong to G. The inner product in G is defined by < x, y >= E[xy].
For each agent i, let H i denote the smallest closed subspace of G containing all observations
obtained by him. Let HTi be the smallest closed subspace of G containing all observations obtained
by agent i up to time n. (Note that H / does not contain all random variables known by agent
i at time n, because it does not need to contain any of the messages received by agent i. Note
also that, by assumption 7, H i C Hn+1 C Hi and that ENk= Hn is the total knowledge available
to all agents, where E denotes the direct sum. The centralized estimate is the projection of x on
EN.1 Hk.) We assume, without loss of generality, that x is a scalar random variable, since each
component can be separately estimated.
Let i E[xI-JfJ and et = x - t and, by the orthog,.nality of errors and observations, we
have E[xy] -E[-tLyi, Vy IIn . Similarly with previous proofs, we have II e+ 12<_lle II2, Vn,i
which implies that
11 112Ž Il 112 t + ll i112 (19)
In particular, (19) implies that {Z} is a norm-bounded sequence. By the weak local sequential
compactness of Hilbert spaces [11, p.126], { k} contains a weakly convergent subsequence {i}.
In other words, there exists an element xoo C G such that < y, 1x > converges to < y,x >,
y E G. Moreover, ,n E z ..cl H C k'l Hk and since closed subspaces are also weakly closed
[11, Theorem 11, p.125], ~ C x %_H Hk. Now let y C H',. Then, < y,:i >=< y,x >, for allI ,k= nl
I such that nl > n, which implies that < y, xoo >=< y, x >. Moreoever, the sequence of spaces
{(H'} generates H i which implies that < y, !oo >=< y, x >, Vy E H i.
By theorem 1, (xi - xn) converges in mean square (and therefore weakly) to zero, which implies
that xoo is also a weak limit point of {(n,}. The same argument as before shows that < y, xoo >=
< y, x >, Vy H, Vj. Therefore, < y, xc >= < y, x >, Vy C k=Z Hk. But this is exactly the
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condition that xo is the centralized estimate, given the observations of all agents. So, {fl} has a
unique weak limit point, which is the same for all i and coincides with the centralized estimate.
It only remains to show that 1i converges to x:~ strongly (in the mean square). We know from'
[11, p.120] that Ilooll lim inf,,,o, IIj: 11. On the other hand,.
11X12 - lliool-2 = I1 - 0l12<x1 - l2 = 11112 - 12 ll1 2 (20)
which shows that Wiooil >_ lim supn,.oo I111. Therefore, lxjl -= lim_, 1+o J 1 and by theorem 8,
p.124 of [I t], we conclude that limn-SO Ililn- 112 = 0. 
Proof of Theorem 8: We use again the Hilbert space formalism of the previous proof. Let Gn be the
subspace of G describing the knowledge of agent i at time n (both his observations and the messages
he has received). By assumption 8, we have G' C G` + j C G. Since G can be chosen to be finite
dimensional, there exists some M (depending on the sequence of communications but deterministic)
such that G n HI,Vn > 0, Vi. Equivalently, M+n = Vn > 0, Vi, and by theorem 7,
AM-Oaf-Adh4 = ,c, = V i-, j. 20
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